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ABSTRACT  
   
Why are human societies so psychologically diverse? The discipline of behavioral 
ecology is rich in both theory and data on how environments shape non-human animal 
behavior. However, behavioral ecological thinking has not received much attention in the 
study of human cultural psychological variation. I propose that ecological relatedness—
how genetically related individuals are to others in their proximate environment—is one 
aspect of the environment that shapes human psychology. I present three studies here that 
examine the influence of ecological relatedness on multiple aspects of psychology. In the 
first study, I find that higher levels of ecological relatedness at the nation level is 
associated with a greater willingness to put oneself at risk for others, greater localized 
trust, and a stronger sense of belonging to one’s community. In the second and third 
studies, using experimental manipulations of perceived ecological relatedness, I examine 
the effects of ecological relatedness on helping behavior across situations, monetary 
sharing on a dictator game, interpersonal judgments, and alloparenting behaviors. I find 
that individuals led to perceive higher ecological relatedness became more sensitive to 
need in potential helping situations. The implications of ecological relatedness for 
thinking about psychological variation across groups are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the mountains of the western U.S., a female Belding ground squirrel sees a 
coyote. She gives off an alarm call. The call alerts surrounding group members of the 
approaching danger, and they scatter in search of cover. But at the same time, the squirrel 
has now put herself in mortal danger, as the coyote now turns its attention towards her.  
Halfway around the world, an earthquake in Japan led to the destabilization of a 
nuclear power plant, leading to the world’s worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl 
(Bradsher & Tabuchi, 2011). In the midst of evacuation, 50 employees stayed in the plant, 
risking their own lives to prevent a nuclear meltdown. Since then, these individuals have 
been dubbed the “Fukushima 50”, and lauded around the world for their bravery. 
Here are individuals from two different species, putting themselves at risk to save 
others. But why would such behaviors even exist in the first place? Any living organism 
that sacrifices itself to save other individuals would be unlikely to pass on its genes to 
future generations, relative to individuals that do not engage in such behavior. Over 
multiple generations, such behavior (and genetic predispositions towards it) would have 
been selected against by evolution and disappeared over time. 
 However, from an evolutionary perspective, self-sacrificing behaviors can be 
biologically adaptive in special circumstances. Simply, sacrificing oneself to save other 
individuals can be adaptive if the individuals saved are genetically related to oneself (and 
sufficiently so). If this is indeed the case, then conditional self-sacrificing behavior could 
have evolved. The general argument is as such: if individuals in our species have faced 
varying levels of genetic relatedness with members of their groups, and different 
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behaviors are more or less adaptive in social environments of differing relatedness (e.g., 
sacrificing oneself to save others is more adaptive when others are highly genetically 
related), then evolution would have selected for flexibilities that alter an individual’s 
behaviors depending on how related the individual is to others around them (e.g., a 
flexibility that increases self-sacrificing behavior when there is a high degree of 
relatedness to others around).  
Beyond self-sacrificing, there are many behaviors that may vary in how 
biologically adaptive they are, depending on how related the individual carrying out these 
behaviors is to other individuals around him/her. One might therefore expect the 
evolution of not one, but multiple flexibilities that are sensitive to one’s relatedness to 
others around them. Each of these flexibilities might influence a variety of behaviors. 
Broadly, I draw upon work from behavioral ecology to generate predictions about the 
nature of these flexibilities in humans, and the potential psychological effects of what I 
will refer to as ecological relatedness, defined as the extent to which people in a given 
environment are genetically related to one another. 
 I first introduce a behavioral ecological approach and the critical concept of 
phenotypic plasticity. Next, I summarize existing literature on ecological relatedness and 
the behaviors that it influences in non-human animals. From this, I then derive a set of 
hypotheses with respect to how ecological relatedness might similarly influence human 
psychology and behavior. I then present three studies that test these hypotheses using 
both correlational and experimental methods. Finally, I discuss the implications of the 
current findings for the concept of ecological relatedness and its relation to human 
psychological diversity.    
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Behavioral Ecology and Phenotypic Plasticity 
 The ground squirrel puts itself at risk to warn its group members. In contrast, the 
tiger salamander does the opposite. In its larval stage, the tiger salamander can take two 
physically distinct forms, “typical” or “cannibalistic” (Collins & Cheek, 1983). The latter 
is morphologically different, having a significantly larger mouth and head shape. True to 
its name, the cannibalistic form consumes other salamander larva around it.  
Both the squirrel’s self-sacrifice and the salamander’s cannibalism are examples 
from behavioral ecology—the study of how ecological pressures lead to variation in 
animal behavior (Davies, Krebs, & West, 2012). Both represent specific examples of 
adaptive phenotypic plasticity—that individuals with the same genes may exhibit 
different traits under different environments (Dingemanse, Kazem, Reale, & Wright, 
2009; Piersma & Drent, 2003; Pigliucci, 2005; West-Eberhard, 1989). Why would 
plasticity exist in the first place? Simply, if in different environments some behaviors are 
more biologically adaptive than others, and organisms have encountered varying 
environments (both temporally and spatially) in their ancestral history, then natural 
selection would have led to the evolution of environmentally sensitive flexibilities. This 
is the broad form of the argument presented earlier focusing on the relatedness aspect of 
environments. 
For the tiger salamander, the cannibalistic form tends to emerge under a specific 
ecology—that of high population density (Collins & Cheek, 1983). The reasoning here is 
that when there are many other individuals in the environment, there will likely be more 
competition for resources, space, and mates. Hence, it is more adaptive under such 
conditions to adopt a form that can remove one’s competition—cannibalism in this case. 
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The plasticity here may be expressed crudely as: if high density, then become 
cannibalistic. For the ground squirrel, the likelihood of alarm calling when a predator 
appears increases when a squirrel has more living kin (e.g., sisters, daughters) in close 
proximity (Sherman, 1977). This plasticity may be expressed as: if high ecological 
relatedness, then call to warn others. The reasoning, as described earlier, is that putting 
oneself in danger for others can be adaptive, if the others saved are genetically related to 
oneself. More formally, this is the idea that organisms have evolved to behave in ways 
that increase their inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964)—the survival and reproduction of 
their genes, not just in themselves, but also in others who also carry them.  
As illustrated by the two examples, both physical and social ecological factors 
(e.g., population density, group relatedness) can have effects on individual traits. 
Plasticity can manifest in both physical and behavioral ways, and the range of possible 
behaviors can be wide, from the cannibalism of others to the sacrifice of the self. The 
study of plasticity in behavioral ecology has received much attention. And plasticity has 
been demonstrated in reaction to a wide variety of ecological factors, such as relatedness, 
population density, disease prevalence, resource availability, predation pressures, sex 
ratio, and many others (Davies, Krebs, & West, 2012). 
In the current proposal, I will focus on the ecological factor of relatedness. In the 
next section, I summarize existing work on the various aspects of this ecological 
dimension, and highlight two behaviors that have received considerable study in relation 
to it: prosociality and alloparenting. 
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Ecological Relatedness: Aspects and Effects 
The prevalence or absence of genetic relatives in an individual’s ecology has 
important fitness implications for the behaviors one might engage in. But how would 
organisms be able to recognize another individual as a genetic relative in the first place? 
Individuals are presumably not born with knowledge of who their kin are. Instead, 
evolution would have selected for the use of cues to infer genetic relatedness, particularly 
cues that ancestrally have been reliable indicators of kinship (see Waldman, 1988, and 
Mateo, 2003, for reviews). 
Because across our evolutionary history individuals have grown up in close 
proximity to family, especially siblings—co-residence is one such cue. Indeed, co-
residence, especially during early developmental life stages, seems to elicit behaviors 
typically observed between kin. For example, ground squirrels that were reared together 
engaged in fewer exploratory behaviors (typically observed between non-kin) when 
interacting with each other, relative to squirrels that were not reared together (Holmes, 
1986). Interestingly, actual genetic relatedness did not matter in this case: genetically 
related squirrels reared together behaved towards one another in a similar way as 
unrelated squirrels reared together. In humans, similar effects of co-residence have been 
found. Siblings who have lived together for a longer period of time are more altruistic 
towards each other (e.g., are more willing to donate a kidney) and also feel more 
disgusted when imagining having sexual acts with their opposite-sex sibling (Lieberman, 
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007). The disgust reaction presumably functions to avoid 
inbreeding. Mirroring the animal examples, such effects also occur in contexts where 
individuals who grow up together are not actual genetic relatives (e.g., Israeli 
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Kibbutzim); co-residence duration predicts peer-directed altruism and sexual aversion 
(Lieberman & Lobel, 2012). 
A second cue that has been uncovered in humans is maternal perinatal association 
(MPA)—the close association of one’s mother with a particular individual (e.g., through 
breastfeeding) (Lieberman et al., 2007). This is arguably a good indicator that the 
individual being cared for by one’s mother is a sibling. Co-residence and MPA are 
interactively used as kinship cues. Specifically, when MPA is not present, both altruism 
towards and sexual disgust at imagined incest with a sibling are predicted by co-residence 
duration. However, when MPA is present, co-residence duration does not predict either 
altruism or incest aversion. Hence, MPA may be considered a more primary cue relative 
to co-residence, with the latter being relied on more when MPA cues are not available 
(e.g., when identifying one’s older siblings).  
A third cue to relatedness is phenotypic similarity. To the extent that greater 
morphological similarity may reflect shared genes, organisms might use similarity to the 
self as a cue of relatedness. This process is referred to as self-phenotype matching in 
behavioral ecology (Hauber & Sherman, 2001; Mateo, 2010), with evidence of it 
occurring via smell (Mateo, 2009; Olsén, Grahn, Lohm, & Langefors, 1998), sight 
(Tibbetts & Injaian, 2013), and sound (Rendall, Rodman, & Emond, 1996). For example, 
in paper wasps, queen wasps tend to preferentially associate and cooperate with other 
queens that have similar facial patterns (Tibbetts & Injaian, 2013). Again, there is also 
some evidence for phenotypic matching in humans. For example, when individuals are 
presented with faces of strangers digitally morphed with their own, they tend to exhibit 
more prosocial behaviors towards these self-resembling morphed targets (Debruine, 
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2005; Krupp, Debruine, & Barclay, 2008). Other work also finds that individuals who 
hold highly similar attitudes (e.g., beliefs about capital punishment) to the self are more 
likely to be mentally categorized as kin (Park & Schaller, 2005).  
From the above, one might expect individuals to be sensitive to the prevalence of 
cues of relatedness in their proximate ecology, allowing an estimate of the average 
relatedness of themselves to others in their ecology. For example, if individuals reside in 
an ecology where they are surrounded by many individuals who have lived with them 
since they were a child (i.e., co-residence cue), this might lead to a perception of high 
ecological relatedness. Another possibility is if individuals are currently in an ecology 
where they are surrounded by many individuals who are physically similar (or similar in 
other phenotypic aspects) to themselves, this could also lead to perceptions of high 
ecological relatedness. 
 Having outlined potential aspects of ecological relatedness, I now summarize 
some existing work on its effects, specifically on prosocial behavior and alloparenting. 
Prosociality. Recall the ground squirrel example. Alarm calling is a behavior that 
seems maladaptive, given the mortal danger that the calling squirrel puts itself in. Yet 
such seemingly maladaptive behavior can be adaptive if there are many genetically 
related individuals (or few but extremely highly related individuals) who would benefit 
from it. In behavioral ecology, such seemingly altruistic behaviors posed an early puzzle 
in evolutionary thinking. The most striking example is arguably the eusocial insects (e.g., 
ants, bees, wasps), in which whole castes of workers sacrifice their own reproduction to 
aid the reproduction of the colony queen. It was difficult to explain how behaviors such 
as these—individual sterility while aiding the reproduction of others—could have 
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evolved. A key insight came from the unique genetic structure of the eusocial insects, 
which is such that workers were actually more closely related to the siblings they help 
raise (75%) than their own potential offspring (50%) (Hamilton, 1972).
1
 Hence, 
behaviors that benefit others at a cost to the self can evolve if the net benefit to one’s 
genes outweighs the costs. 
Subsequently, relatedness has often been examined in terms of its effects on 
prosocial behavior. Across multiple species, animals in proximity of genetically-related 
individuals tend to affiliate more with and engage in more prosocial behavior towards 
these individuals (e.g., Hesse, Bakker, Baldauf, & Thunken, 2012; Holmes, 1995; 
Lihoreau & Rivault, 2009; Mateo, 2010; Sherman, 1977; Sherman, 1985; Wilkinson, 
1985). For instance, urban cockroaches, across all developmental stages, prefer 
socializing with genetically related individuals (compared to non-relatives), even when 
they have never encountered these individuals before (Lihoreau & Rivault, 2009). Like 
the ground squirrels, prairie dogs, upon detecting predators, are more likely to alarm call 
when there are genetic relatives in proximity (Hoogland, 1983). Finally, vampire bats are 
more likely to regurgitate and share blood with related individuals (Wilkinson, 1985). 
Note that greater prosociality under high relatedness conditions does not 
necessarily imply lower levels of competition. In the animal literature, related individuals 
                                                 
1
 Note that subsequent work has argued that the genetic structure of the eusocial insects 
is, by itself, an insufficient condition for the evolution of eusociality. Other conditions, 
such as monogamy, need to have also been present for the evolutionary emergence of 
such a phenomenon (e.g., Boomsma, 2009). 
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have sometimes been found to be just as or even more competitive towards one another 
than unrelated individuals are (Bernstein & Ehardt, 1986; Packer & Pusey, 1982; Wahaj 
et al., 2004). One reason this can occur is because genetically similar individuals may 
draw upon the same kinds of resources, leading to greater competition over limited 
resource pools (Waldman, 1988). However, what is crucial here is that such competition 
between related individuals, even when high, should be unlikely to become lethal. Given 
that kin may also be potential competitors, one might expect the effects of relatedness on 
prosocial behavior to more strongly emerge when related individuals are actually facing 
mortal danger, as in the case of the ground squirrel example. 
Similar effects have also been found in humans. As highlighted by examples 
earlier, people behave in a more prosocial manner towards individuals of (perceived) 
higher relatedness. Individuals are more likely to trust people whose faces have been 
morphed to be similar to their own (Debruine, 2005; Krupp, Debruine, & Barclay, 2008). 
Siblings who have co-resided for a longer duration of time report a greater likelihood of 
engaging in costly helping behaviors towards one another (Lieberman, Tooby, & 
Cosmides, 2007). Finally, in self-reports about helping behavior, individuals are more 
likely to help highly related individuals, particularly when faced with life-or-death 
situations (e.g., when forced to choose between saving a sister or cousin from a burning 
building) (Burnstein, Crandall & Kitayama, 1994). Hence, individuals in our species also 
behave in more prosocial ways towards genetically related others. 
From this, one might predict that general prosocial behavior should also vary 
according to ecological relatedness, with greater prosociality emerging under conditions 
of higher ecological relatedness. In addition, such greater prosociality may be most likely 
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to emerge when the potential benefit to inclusive fitness is high, or more relevant to the 
various examples described, when the potential inclusive fitness costs (if help is not 
provided) are high. 
Besides one’s own prosocial behavior, one might also consider how the prosocial 
or anti-social behaviors of others might be evaluated in ecologies of varying relatedness. 
In a high relatedness ecology, given that the prosocial behavior of another can lead to 
greater inclusive fitness benefits for an individual, individuals in high relatedness 
ecologies (relative to low) might evaluate prosocial individuals especially positively. On 
the flip side, however, individuals in higher-relatedness ecologies might evaluate anti-
social behaviors, particularly lethal ones (e.g., physical aggression, homicide), especially 
negatively, due to the greater inclusive fitness costs imposed by such anti-social 
behaviors. Therefore, a second prediction is that individuals in high relatedness ecologies 
will be more polarized in their evaluations of prosocial versus anti-social behaviors. That 
is, prosocial behaviors will be judged more positively than anti-social ones in general, but 
this difference should be greater in high relatedness ecologies. 
To summarize, I hypothesize that individuals in high relatedness ecologies will be 
more prosocial, especially under conditions when potential inclusive fitness costs for not 
helping are high. My second hypothesis is that when evaluating the behaviors of others, 
individuals will tend to judge prosocial behaviors more positively in high-relatedness 
conditions, but will also judge anti-social behaviors more negatively. 
Alloparenting. Alloparents are individuals that care for offspring that are not 
their own. The example of the eusocial insects is one instance of this. This is also referred 
to as the “helper at the nest” phenomenon, or cooperative breeding. Alloparenting has 
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been documented across multiple species, with the most extensive empirical work being 
done in birds (e.g., Clarke, 1984; Cockburn, 1998; Curry, 1988; Dierkes et al., 2005; 
Emlen, 1978; Komdeur & Hatchwell, 1999; Mumme, 1992; Nam, Simeoni, Sharp, & 
Hatchwell, 2010; Wright, McDonald, Marvelde, Kazem, & Bishop, 2009). For instance, 
in white-fronted bee-eaters, the probability of individuals being a helper at the nest 
increased with the degree of relatedness of the individual to the nestlings (Emlen & 
Wrege, 1988). In long-tailed tits, when both kin and non-kin nests were in similar 
proximity, more than 90% of individuals chose to help at the nest with kin (Russell & 
Hatchwell, 2001). Finally, in a meta-analysis across 18 species, higher levels of 
relatedness generally predicted a higher probability of helping another’s offspring, and 
this was particularly so in species for which there was a strong benefit of such helping on 
offspring survival (Griffin & West, 2003; see also Cornwallis, West & Griffin, 2009). 
Interestingly, there was no general effect of relatedness on the amount of helping, which 
is argued to be influenced by many other factors, such as the helper’s own physical 
condition, and may subsequently be a more noisy measure. 
This connects to a critical question in cooperative breeding: who are the 
individuals that help? As mentioned, one factor here is how related individuals are to the 
potential recipients of help. But even amongst related individuals, there are both breeders 
and helpers. While the body of work documenting alloparenting is substantial, the 
individual differences between breeders and non-breeders (helpers) are less well 
understood. Some work has documented that helpers are often young juveniles—
individuals that have not reached reproductive status themselves (e.g., Brown, 1987; 
Stacey & Koenig, 1990; Valencia, de la Cruz, & Gonzalez, 2003). Other work, however, 
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finds the opposite, with older individuals investing more in cooperative breeding (e.g., 
Boland, Heinsohn, & Cockburn, 1997; Clutton-Brock et al., 2001; Dickinson, Koenig & 
Pitelka, 1996). In general, it seems that these inconsistencies may be the result of the 
interplay of two factors: the provisioning ability of the helper (i.e., older individuals may 
be more successful at foraging and subsequently have more to give) and the independent 
reproductive options of the helper (i.e., younger individuals may be less able to 
successfully compete for mates and therefore more likely to invest in indirect 
reproduction—alloparenting). 
Cooperative breeding has also been observed in some hunter-gatherer groups 
(Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster & Hurtado, 2000; Mace & Sear, 2005). Males in the Ache were 
much more likely than females to be food providers to breeding pairs, and this was 
particularly so for unmarried and younger males (Hill & Hurtado, 2009). The sex 
difference may be because males experience greater variation in reproductive success 
(i.e., more males than females end up not reproducing at all), and are subsequently more 
likely to invest in alloparenting as a means of indirect reproduction. That unmarried and 
younger males are more likely to engage in cooperative breeding may simply reflect 
fewer resource demands on these males. 
In sum, theory and data in behavioral ecology suggest that (1) organisms have 
evolved to detect cues of relatedness in other individuals in their ecology, and (2) higher 
levels of ecological relatedness generally lead to both greater prosocial behavior and a 
greater prevalence of alloparenting. Also, such effects of relatedness can be moderated by 
other factors, both ecological and individual (e.g., potential reproductive success). From 
this, one might expect humans to also be sensitive to the average relatedness of their 
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proximate group, and alter their behaviors accordingly, depending on what would be 
more adaptive in their specific ecology. 
Note that I am not proposing that ecological relatedness accounts for the origin of 
widespread human cooperation, as actual mean genetic relatedness between adults in 
modern hunter gatherer groups is relatively low (mean relatedness coefficient is about 
0.05; Hill et al., 2011). What I am proposing is that individuals detect variation in 
average group relatedness that can occur both temporally and spatially, and that this 
variation should lead to adaptive shifts in social behaviors. Below, I summarize my 
primary hypotheses and overview three studies testing these hypotheses. 
Overview 
 Broadly, I hypothesize that, as a form of adaptive phenotypic plasticity, 
individuals are sensitive to how related they are to others in their immediate ecology, and 
that they subsequently adjust their behaviors in predictable ways depending on ecological 
relatedness. I outline my three main predictions below: 
H1. Individuals in ecologies of high relatedness will be more prosocial. This effect may 
emerge specifically when the inclusive fitness costs of not helping are high, such 
as “life-or-death” scenarios, or when one’s entire group is under external threat. 
H2. Individuals in ecologies of high relatedness will be more polarized in their 
evaluations of prosocial and anti-social behaviors of others; they will judge 
prosocial behaviors more positively (due to the greater inclusive fitness benefits) 
and anti-social behaviors more negatively (due to the greater inclusive fitness 
costs). 
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H3: Individuals in an ecology of high relatedness will be more likely to exhibit 
alloparenting behavior—caring for children who are not their own. This effect 
may emerge only, or be strongest, for individuals who are less able to reproduce 
themselves and hence most likely to engage in indirect reproduction. From work 
reviewed earlier, such individuals may be males not currently in a reproductive 
life stage (men without children), or males who expect to have low success in 
finding a mate (men with low desirability as a mate). 
I first present a preliminary study, in which I examine the relationships between a proxy 
of ecological relatedness at the nation level—the prevalence of cousin marriages in a 
country—and various psychological traits that it should theoretically influence. Then, in 
my two dissertation studies, I use an experimental manipulation of ecological relatedness 
and examine its effects on prosocial helping, evaluations of prosocial and antisocial 
others, and alloparenting tendencies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRELIMINARY STUDY: NATION-LEVEL RELATEDNESS  
 One way of testing the effects of ecological relatedness is examining 
psychological differences across groups that live in ecologies of varying relatedness. 
Existing work has tested other ecological hypotheses using nations as units of analysis. 
For instance, people in nations with historical higher pathogen prevalence have been 
found to be lower in extroversion and openness, and are less inclined towards casual 
sexual relationships (Schaller & Murray, 2008). Such tendencies are presumably adaptive 
in environments with high pathogen loads, as they function to help avoid exposure to 
disease. Other ongoing work finds that psychological variation across nations is predicted 
by population density, with people in more dense nations exhibiting traits that correspond 
to a slower (as opposed to faster) life history strategy, which includes traits such as being 
more future-oriented, investing in building one’s skills, having fewer children, and 
investing more in each child (Sng, Neuberg, Varnum, & Kenrick, under review). A slow 
life history strategy is presumably more adaptive in highly dense environments due to 
intense social competition between conspecifics, which increases the need to invest in 
building one’s competitive ability and to focus resources on fewer offspring in order to 
increase reproductive competitiveness of offspring themselves. 
 In a similar vein, I predict that average relatedness at the nation level is related to 
predictable psychological differences. Note that although one might operationalize 
ecological variables at the nation level, this should not be taken to imply that it is the 
ecology of an entire nation that is exerting an effect on any specific individual. In the two 
examples of ecological disease and density mentioned above, there is presumably 
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considerable local variation within nations in both pathogen prevalence and social density. 
Measuring ecologies at the nation level serves as a crude estimate, at best, of the more 
proximate ecologies that individuals are more likely to interact with and be exposed to in 
their everyday lives (e.g., one’s own town or neighborhood). Hence, an indicator of 
average relatedness at the nation level is presumed to reflect, to some degree, relatedness 
of one’s proximate group within the nation. If anything, that nation-level ecological 
measures may miss finer ecological variation within a nation would lead to a more crude 
and conservative test of my hypotheses. 
 To assess ecological relatedness, I used existing data on the frequency of cousin 
marriages as a proxy. The presumption here is that the higher the prevalence of cousin 
marriages, the higher the average degree of relatedness individuals will have with others 
around them. I then examined the relationship of this proxy with similar nation-level data 
on general willingness to defend one’s country (as a measure of potential self-sacrifice), 
trust, and sense of connectedness towards various groups.   
Method 
Ecological Relatedness. To assess relatedness, I obtained secondary data on the 
proportion of consanguineous marriages at the nation level (Hoben, Buunk, Fincher, 
Thornhill & Schaller, 2010). These are defined as marriages between individuals who are 
second cousins (sharing a same great-grandparent) or closer. The original data were 
gathered from reviews of past clinical genetics research beginning from the 1950s (Bittles, 
2001) and can be found on www.consang.net. Data were available for 71 geopolitical 
regions. Data for both consanguineous marriages and the psychological measures of 
interest were available for a subset of 36 regions. The mean percentage of 
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consanguineous marriages in this subset was 16.8% (S.D. = 17.8), and ranged from .1% 
(Croatia) to 51.7% (Kuwait).  
 Dependent Measures. Data on relevant dependent measures were gathered from 
the sixth and most recent wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), which was carried 
out between the years 2010-2014. Interviews were conducted across 60 different 
countries, with samples in each country numbering 1000 individuals or more. 
 The first dependent measure was a single item that asked about people’s 
willingness to defend their country. The item was phrased: “Of course, we all hope that 
there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight 
for your country?” Participants responded either yes or no. I used the percentage of 
individuals in each country who responded yes. This represents a proxy to prosocial 
behavior, specifically when one’s group is under threat. 
 A second set of dependent measures captures self-reported trust towards a variety 
of groups. Previous work has found that individuals are more likely to trust others who 
show cues of relatedness (e.g., facial similarity; Debruine, 2002). One might therefore 
expect higher ecological relatedness to be associated with greater trust, but specifically 
towards one’s own group members. I focus here on three theoretically relevant groups. 
Participants in the WVS were asked how much they trust their family, people from their 
neighborhood, and people of another nationality. They responded to these three items on 
a 4-point scale (1= Do not trust at all, 4 = Trust completely). I use the aggregate score at 
the nation level for each of these three items. Neighbors represent potential own group 
members, while people of another nationality should not. The prediction is therefore that 
individuals will be more trusting towards their neighbors in high-relatedness ecologies, 
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but not necessarily towards individuals of another nationality. For trust towards family 
members, I had no strong prediction. It is possible that higher relatedness will also lead to 
greater trust amongst family members (e.g., if an individual’s parents are cousins, then 
he/she is likely also more highly related to his/her siblings than if their parents were 
unrelated), and hence potentially higher trust. However, it is also possible that trust 
towards family members may simply be extremely high to begin with, and that there is 
little room for further variation. 
 A final set of dependent measures captures perceptions of the self. One distinction 
made in the psychological literature of the self is that of independent-interdependent 
selves. An interdependent self is a conception of the self as being inextricably connected 
to others, and is associated with behaviors that put the interests of one’s group before the 
self, along with greater social empathy and regard for others (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 
2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). I examined three relevant items on the WVS. 
Participants were asked how strongly they agree or disagree with three statements: “I see 
myself as part of my local community”, “I see myself as part of the [PARTICIPANT’S 
NATION]”, and “I see myself as a world citizen” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = Strongly 
Agree). Again, the aggregate score at the nation level for each of these three items was 
used. The prediction here is that higher relatedness should be associated with a more 
interdependent self but once again specifically with own group members (community and 
possibly fellow citizens), but not with the world at large. 
Results and Discussion 
All analyses presented here are Pearson correlations. First, the prevalence of 
cousin marriages was indeed correlated in the predicted direction with willingness to 
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fight for one’s country. The higher the relatedness, the more people in a country were 
likely to say they would be willing to fight for their country under conditions of war, r 
= .41, p = .013. For trust, the higher the relatedness, the more trusting people were 
towards their neighbors (r = .53, p < .001). There was no relationship between 
relatedness and trust towards family or foreigners (r = .08, p = .65, and r = -.15, p = .39, 
respectively). Finally, for perceptions of the self, the higher the relatedness, the more 
people saw themselves as part of their community and country (r = .45, p = .006, and r 
= .35, p = .036 respectively). There was no relationship between relatedness and 
perception of the self as world citizen (r = -.05, p = .78). 
 Using prevalence of cousin marriages as a crude proxy of ecological relatedness, I 
find meaningful relationships between relatedness and theoretically relevant 
psychological traits. First, higher levels of ecological relatedness are associated with a 
greater willingness to put oneself at risk for the group, in this case being willing to fight 
for one’s country if there was a war. Second, higher ecological relatedness was also 
associated with greater interpersonal trust of one’s proximate group (neighbors), but not 
beyond (foreigners). Finally, individuals in higher relatedness ecologies saw their selves 
as more connected to proximate groups (community and country), but not beyond (world 
citizenship). Again, it is important to remind here that the conceptual argument being 
made is that the average relatedness of others around is what is influencing individual 
psychology, not the average relatedness of everyone in a country. The use of a country-
level indicator is useful because it is assumed to be associated to some extent to 
ecological relatedness at smaller geographical scales within the country (e.g., 
neighborhoods). To the extent that this association is imperfect, the use of the country-
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level relatedness proxy would have underestimated the strength of the relationships I am 
finding. 
 Nevertheless, this preliminary study is limited in multiple ways. Correlational 
analyses do not provide evidence for direct causality. There have also been 
methodological issues raised with regard to how correlations across cultures should be 
interpreted (e.g., Hruschka & Hackman, 2014; Pollet, Tybur, Frankenhuis, & Rickard, 
2014). In addition, data on measures more directly relevant to my main hypotheses (e.g., 
interpersonal judgments, alloparenting) were not available. Hence, in focal Studies 1 and 
2, I use experimental manipulations of ecological relatedness to carry out more precise 
tests of my hypotheses. Specifically, I provide individuals with information that 
ostensibly alters their perceptions of ecological relatedness, and examine its subsequent 
effects on prosocial behavior and evaluations of others’ anti/prosocial behavior (Study 1), 
and alloparenting tendencies (Study 2). 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 1 
In this study, I examine two central hypotheses. First, I propose that individuals in 
ecologies of higher relatedness will tend to behave more prosocially, but particularly so 
when there are strong potential implications for inclusive fitness (e.g., life-or-death 
situations, when one’s entire group is under external threat). Second, I propose that 
individuals in ecologies of higher relatedness will be more polarized in their judgments of 
prosocial behaviors relative to antisocial behaviors, judging prosocial behavior even more 
positively and antisocial behaviors even more negatively. Again, the rationale is that such 
behaviors carry greater inclusive fitness implications in a high relatedness ecology (e.g., 
antisocial behaviors may inflict harm on not just oneself, but also genetically related 
others, in a high relatedness ecology).   
 To test these hypotheses, I use an experimental manipulation designed to alter 
perceptions of ecological relatedness—popular science news articles that present research 
showing that individuals are more, or less, genetically related to one another than 
previously known to be. 
Method 
Participants. Two-hundred and fifty participants (119 women) were recruited 
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and compensated $1.00 for their participation. The 
mean age of these participants was 35.4 years (SD = 11.8). 
Procedure. Participants signed up for a “Social Memory Survey.”  Participants 
previewing the task read the participant consent form and were then directed to a link 
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where they could complete the survey. Upon entering the survey, participants were 
randomly assigned to either the high or low ecological relatedness conditions. 
Participants in the high ecological relatedness condition read a fictitious 
newspaper article titled “Surprisingly, DNA survey finds that people are genetically 
similar to the strangers around them,” which described how recent scientific research had 
discovered that people were much more genetically related to those around them than 
previously expected. For example, as part of the article, participants read: 
Whether you hail from Richmond, Ulan Bator or Nairobi, your genetic make-up is 
strikingly similar to that of people around you, a new analysis concludes. 
Scientists have long recognized that, despite physical differences, most human 
populations are genetically similar. The new work concludes that people within a 
population may share many more genetic similarities with one another than 
previously assumed. The estimates are striking, indeed. In layman terms, 
according to the new study, about 1 in 4 people we encounter in our everyday 
lives may have a great-great-grandparent in common. The results of the study, 
published today in the journal Science, have implications for understanding 
population change and human migration, said Professor Morris Feldman of 
Harvard University who led the team. “These new estimates of relatedness can 
seem surprising, especially given that we all seem to look so different from one 
another. But there is growing evidence suggesting that very small differences in 
DNA may be all that underlie the things that make us look different. At the 
genetic level, we are far more similar than meets the eye…” 
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Participants in the low ecological relatedness condition read a similarly formatted article 
titled “Surprisingly, DNA survey finds that people are genetically dissimilar to those 
around them,” which described the reverse—that recent research had discovered that 
people were much less genetically related than expected to those around them (for full 
essays see Appendix A).  
 Everyday vs. life-or-death helping. After reading either the high or low 
relatedness article, participants then completed a measure of helping in everyday versus 
life-or-death situations. Participants read two imaginary scenarios (see Appendix B for 
full scenarios). In one scenario (everyday helping), participants imagined coming across a 
person whose car seemed to have broken down, on their way to a meeting. They were 
then asked how likely they would stop to help this person, on a scale of 0% (Definitely 
not help) to 100% (Definitely help).  
 In the other scenario (life-or-death helping), participants imagined coming across 
a burning building and hearing a call for help by someone presumably stuck in the 
building. Again, they were then asked how likely they would enter the burning building 
to help this person, on the same scale of 0% (Definitely not help) to 100% (Definitely 
help). The presentation order of the two scenarios was randomized. 
 Helping under external threat vs. without external threat. After completing 
the everyday/life-or-death helping scenarios, participants then completed a measure of 
helping under external threat or without threat (Appendix C).  
 For helping without threat, participants were told to imagine that the U.S. was 
currently not at war, and that the U.S. president had given a television address 
announcing a proposal to raise taxes for military funding, and had asked Americans to 
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support this proposal. For helping under external threat, participants were now told to 
imagine that another country had attacked the U.S., and there would likely be severe 
casualties. Again, the president had given a similar television address announcing a 
proposal to raise taxes for military funding, and was asking for American support. After 
reading each situation, participants were asked to rate their likelihood of supporting the 
tax raise proposal on a scale of 1 (Not at all support) to 9 (Definitely support). The order 
of presentation for each of the two situations was randomized. 
Dictator game. Following the helping measures, participants then played a 
dictator game (see Appendix D). Participants were told that they had now been given a 
bonus amount of $0.50, from which they were to decide how much to allocate to another 
randomly chosen participant in the study versus keep for themselves. They were told that 
whatever amount they chose to keep would be allocated to them as a bonus payment at 
the end of the study. 
Booster Manipulation. Upon completing the dictator game, participants then 
completed an experimental manipulation “booster”, in which they were asked to recall 
the newspaper article (i.e., the manipulation of high or low ecological relatedness) they 
read at the beginning of the study, and to write a few sentences summarizing the content 
of the article. The purpose of such a procedure is to bring to memory the experimental 
manipulation, due to the potential decay of the psychological effects of the manipulation 
over time. Similar procedures have been used in previous research (e.g., Griskevicius, 
Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006). 
Social Evaluation. After the booster manipulation, participants were then 
presented with the profiles of two hypothetical target individuals (see Appendix E). Each 
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target individual had supposedly completed a questionnaire containing items adapted 
from a measure of the Dark Triad (i.e., Narcissism, Psychopathy, Machiavellianism) 
(Jonason & Webster, 2010). Two sample items are “I tend to exploit others towards my 
own end” and “I tend to manipulate others to get my way”, on scale from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The scores of the two hypothetical targets were such that 
one appeared to engage in more anti-social behavior (i.e., strongly agreeing to the item “I 
tend to exploit others towards my own end”) than the other (referred to here as the pro-
social target).  
 After viewing the questionnaire profile of each target, participants then evaluated 
how positive-negative they felt about the target (1 = Extremely Negative, 9 = Extremely 
Positive), and how much they liked or disliked the target (1 = Strongly Dislike, 9 = 
Strongly Like). Ratings of the two items for each target were averaged to form a general 
evaluation score (rs = .70 for prosocial target, .84 for antisocial target)—higher scores 
mean greater positivity/liking. Finally, participants also reported how much they would 
like each target as a potential neighbor, friend, or family member (1 = Strongly Dislike, 9 
= Strongly Like). The three ratings for each target were also combined to create a general 
social choice score for each target (prosocial target: α = .96; antisocial target: α = .94)—
higher scores mean greater preference of a target as a social partner. 
Results 
 I present the findings for each set of measures in the same sequence as they were 
presented in the study. For each measure, I first reiterate my predictions, followed by the 
analyses testing the prediction.  
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 Everyday vs. life-or-death helping. I predicted that people will be more willing 
to help when they believe that others around them are highly related to themselves. This 
effect, however, should be greater for life-or-death helping than everyday helping, given 
that there are higher potential inclusive fitness costs for not helping genetic relatives. To 
test this, I performed a 2 (Relatedness condition: High/Low ecological relatedness) X 2 
(Helping type: Everyday/Life-or-death) mixed measures ANOVA. 
 There was no main effect of Relatedness Condition, F(1, 246) = .08, p = .77. 
There was a main effect of Helping Type, F(1, 246) = 40.46, p < .001; participants 
reported being more likely to help in the life-or-death scenario than the everyday scenario. 
This was, however, qualified by a significant Relatedness Condition X Helping Type 
interaction, F(1, 246) = 4.62, p = .033 (see Figure 1). From pairwise comparisons, 
participants were more likely to help in the life-or-death scenario than the everyday 
scenario in both relatedness conditions (both ps < .01), but this difference was greater in 
the high relatedness condition. In other words, participants led to believe that they were 
in a high relatedness ecology seemed to differentiate more strongly between life-or-death 
and everyday helping. For the simple effects of relatedness condition on each helping 
type, neither were statistically significant (everyday helping: p = .15; life-or-death 
helping: p = .30)—there was no difference in helping between the low and high 
relatedness conditions for both everyday and life-or-death helping. 
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Figure 1. Everyday versus life-or-death helping by relatedness condition. Error bars are 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Helping under external threat vs. without external threat. My second 
prediction was that people would be more willing to help under higher ecological 
relatedness, but particularly so when the group is facing an external threat. To test this, I 
performed a 2 (High/Low Relatedness Condition) X 2 (Helping under External Threat/No 
Threat) mixed measures ANOVA. 
 Contrary to predictions, there was no interaction effect, F(1, 248) = .05, p = .82 
(Figure 2). There was also no effect of Relatedness Condition, F(1, 248) = .04, p = .85. 
There was a main effect of Helping type, F(1, 248) = 181.60, p < .001; people were more 
willing to support the tax increase if the U.S. was facing external threat, compared to 
when not. 
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Figure 2. Helping with/without external threat by relatedness condition. Error bars are 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Dictator game. I predicted that individuals in the high relatedness condition, to 
the extent that they engage in more prosocial behavior, would also give more in the 
dictator game. I performed an independent samples t-test to examine this. There was, 
however, no effect of Relatedness Condition on amount shared in the dictator game, 
t(247) = .98, p = .33 (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Average amount shared in dictator game by relatedness condition. Error bars 
are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 Social Evaluation. Finally, I predicted that participants in the high relatedness 
condition will be more polarized in their evaluations of prosocial and antisocial others—
they will judge prosocial others more positively and antisocial others more negatively. 
This is due to the potential greater inclusive fitness benefits of prosocial actors, and 
correspondingly greater inclusive fitness costs of antisocial actors, in high relatedness 
environments. To test this, I performed a 2 (High/Low Relatedness Condition) X 2 
(Prosocial/Antisocial Target) mixed measures ANOVA on the general evaluation and 
social choice measures separately. 
 For general evaluation, contrary to predictions, there was no interaction effect, 
F(1, 242) = .93, p = .34. There was also no effect of Relatedness Condition, F(1, 242) = 
1.45, p = .23. The only significant effect was that of Target Type, F(1, 242) = 405.66, p 
< .001; the antisocial target was evaluated more negatively than the prosocial target 
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(Figure 5, left panel). For the social choice measure (i.e., preference for target as 
neighbor/friend/family member), there was also no interaction effect, F(1, 244) = .23, p 
= .63, but both the Target Type and Relatedness Condition main effects were significant 
(Figure 5, right panel). First, the antisocial target was also generally less favored relative 
to the prosocial target, as a social partner, F(1, 244) = 558.67, p < .001. In addition, 
participants in the high relatedness condition rated both targets less favorably than those 
in the low relatedness condition, F(1, 244) = 4.83, p = .029. This finding was not 
predicted, and I discuss this briefly below. 
  
Figure 4. General positivity/liking (left) and social preference (right) for prosocial and 
antisocial targets by relatedness condition. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
  
Summary and Discussion 
 In general, the manipulation of ecological relatedness did not have the predicted 
effects. There was no effect of the relatedness manipulation on helping under external 
threat (i.e., tax raises to support the military under war conditions), or sharing on the 
dictator game.  However, there did seem to be an effect on helping in life-or-death versus 
everyday situations. Specifically, although participants generally reported being more 
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likely to help in the life-or-death situation than the everyday helping situation, this 
difference was larger for participants who were led to perceive that they were in a high 
relatedness ecology. In addition, there was an unpredicted general effect of the 
relatedness manipulation on social preferences—participants in the high (relative to low) 
relatedness condition disliked both the prosocial and antisocial individuals as potential 
social partners (neighbors/friends/family members).  
 That participants reported being more likely to help in the life-or-death than the 
everyday situation may reflect a general sensitivity towards need—the person in the 
burning building could have lost their life whereas the person with the flat tire was in no 
immediate physical danger. If this is indeed so, then one implication is that perceivers in 
the high relatedness condition (relative to those in the low relatedness condition), in their 
greater differentiation of reported helping between the two situations, became more 
sensitive to others’ needs (or lack thereof). In a high relatedness ecology, this heightened 
sensitivity to need might serve the function of prioritizing toward whom an individual 
directs his or her helping, particularly with the aim of minimizing inclusive fitness costs 
(i.e., having a genetically related individual die). 
 Unexpectedly, participants in the high relatedness condition were more likely to 
dislike both the prosocial and antisocial individuals as potential social partners. My 
specific prediction had been that participants in the high relatedness condition would be 
less favorable towards the antisocial individuals but more favorable towards the prosocial 
individual. However, given that this same pattern was not observed for the general 
positivity measures (i.e., participants in the high and low relatedness conditions did not 
differ in how positively they perceived the hypothetical individuals), I am cautious about 
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drawing any conclusions from this. In addition, there are some methodological 
considerations with the current design for testing the social evaluation predictions. I 
elaborate on these in the General Discussion. 
Contrary to predictions, there were no effects of the relatedness manipulation on 
helping under external threat (i.e., when one’s country is at war), or sharing in a dictator 
game. Methodologically, one possibility is that the effects of the manipulation decayed 
rapidly, and were no longer exerting psychological effects after the first set of measures 
(helping under life-or-death/everyday situations). This possibility seems particularly 
plausible given that the two measures most affected by the manipulation followed 
immediately either the article manipulation or the booster manipulation. Also, although 
sharing on the dictator game involved actual money and is thus presumably more 
reflective of true behaviors (relative to hypothetical decisions), the individuals who 
participants presumed they would be sharing with are not clearly in need. And the general 
prediction with respect to relatedness’ effects on helping behavior is that they are most 
likely to emerge when inclusive fitness consequences are high.  
Finally, a general issue is that the predictions so far have focused on how higher 
levels of relatedness engage greater prosocial behavior. Yet there is the possibility of the 
opposite occurring. As mentioned in the introductory review of behavioral ecological 
work, individuals do not always act more prosocially toward kin. For example, highly 
related others may also be competitors to the extent that similar individuals draw upon 
similar types of resources. I elaborate on this in the General Discussion. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 2: RELATEDNESS AND ALLOPARENTING 
 In the second study, I examine the last focal hypothesis: that individuals in 
ecologies of higher relatedness will be more likely to engage in alloparenting. However, 
this effect should hold only, or be strongest, for individuals who are less able to 
reproduce themselves, or who are not yet in the life stage when they would be doing so. 
As outlined before, such individuals may be men who expect to have low success in 
finding a mate (men with low desirability as a mate) or men not currently in a 
reproductive life stage (men without children).  
 To test these hypotheses, I use similar procedures as Study 1. Participants read 
either the low or high ecological relatedness manipulation article, and then completed 
measures of alloparenting tendencies. Finally, they also completed other individual 
difference measures used to test the specific hypotheses mentioned above. 
Method 
Participants. Two-hundred and fifty-two participants (128 women) were 
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and compensated $0.50. The mean age of 
these participants was 35.1 years (SD = 12.1). 
Procedure. The general procedures of Study 2 were similar to that of Study 1. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the high or low ecological relatedness 
conditions, and read the same articles as described in Study 1. After reading the 
newspaper article, participants then completed a measure of alloparenting behavior. 
 Alloparenting Measure. Participants first read a brief description of the Big 
Brothers Big Sisters of America Program (Appendix F)—a volunteer program dedicated 
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to finding adult mentors for children between 6 and 18 years of age who come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. After reading the program description, participants were 
asked how much time they would be willing to spend with a child from the program 
every month, ranging from 0 to 20 or more hours, in 1 hour increments. In addition, they 
also reported how much money they would be willing to donate to Big Brothers Big 
Sisters, on a scale from $0 to $100 or more. 
 Following this, participants also responded to two items that asked how many 
hours per week (from 0 to 10) they would be willing to spend (a) coaching children’s 
sports teams, and (b) tutoring others’ children in reading, writing and arithmetic. The two 
items (r = .48) were combined to form a composite time investment score.  
Mate value. After completing the alloparenting measures, participants then filled 
out a self-perceived mate value scale (Landolt, Lalumiere & Quinsey, 1995)—a measure 
of participant’s self-perceived mating success. The purpose of the scale is to test the 
hypothesis that males with lower desirability as a mate would be most likely to engage in 
alloparenting under high ecological relatedness. A sample item on the scale is “Members 
of the opposite sex that I like, tend to like me back.” (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly 
Agree). 
Current number of children.  At the end of the study, along with other 
demographic items, participants were asked how many children they currently have. 
Again, this was to test the prediction that males without children would be most likely to 
engage in alloparenting under high ecological relatedness. 
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Results and Discussion 
 I predicted that individuals will be more likely to engage in alloparenting behavior 
under a high relatedness condition, but that this will be especially likely for (a) men who 
have not yet reproduced themselves or (b) who are unlikely to do so (men with a low 
mate value).  
 To examine the first prediction, I carried out a 2 (Participant Sex) X 2 
(Relatedness Condition: High/Low Ecological Relatedness) X 2 (Reproductive Status: 
No children/Has children) ANOVAs on the alloparenting measures. For volunteered time 
for the Big Brother program, contrary to predictions, there were no significant effects (Fs 
< .96, ps > .32). There were also no significant effects for donation amount (all Fs < 1.98, 
ps > .16), with the exception of a main effect of reproductive status—individuals with 
children were willing to donate more than those without children, F(1, 243) = 7.47, p 
= .007. Finally, there were no significant effects for the volunteer coaching/tutoring 
composite (all Fs < 1.24, ps > .26). 
To test the second prediction that men with lower mate value would engage in 
greater alloparenting under high relatedness conditions, I carried out a series of multiple 
regressions with participant sex, Relatedness Condition, mate value, and the interactions 
of the three as predictors, with the same three alloparenting measures as dependent 
variables. Again, there were no significant effects of any of the predictors on all three 
alloparenting measures (all Fs < 1.62, ps > .10). 
In summary, the focal hypotheses were not supported. The relatedness 
manipulation did not have any effect on alloparenting behavior as measured in the current 
study. I discuss potential reasons and implications in the General Discussion. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In one preliminary study and two focal studies, I examined the effects of 
ecological relatedness on a variety of behaviors, using both correlational and 
experimental methods. The premise underlying the current work is that individual 
behaviors vary in how biologically adaptive they are depending on the degree to which 
others around are genetically related. The argument therefore is that individuals should 
have evolved to be sensitive to ecological relatedness, and to adjust their behaviors 
depending on what would be more adaptive in their specific environment. This draws 
upon the general notion of adaptive phenotypic plasticity in behavioral ecology. 
 First, examining ecological relatedness at a broad scale using nation level cousin 
marriages as a proxy, I find that higher ecological relatedness is associated with greater 
willingness to fight for one’s country, more trust towards one’s neighbors, and greater 
connectedness to one’s community (but not towards foreigners). These findings track 
what I expected from the existing literature on kin psychology:  individuals act in more 
prosocial ways towards, and are more trusting of, kin. 
 The findings from the two experimental studies were less clear. Experimentally 
manipulated ecological relatedness did not influence group helping under external threat, 
sharing on a dictator game, evaluations of prosocial and antisocial others, or alloparenting 
behavior. Individuals led to perceive higher ecological relatedness did, however, become 
more sensitive towards need in potential helping situations. Specifically, people reported 
that they were more likely to help a person in a life-or-death situation (someone trapped 
in a burning building) than a person in a more everyday situation (someone with a broken 
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down car), but this difference was larger for individuals in a high (relative to low) 
ecological relatedness condition. 
 There are several potential reasons for the current findings. Below, I first discuss 
specific methodological considerations of the current work. 
Methodological Considerations 
 In the preliminary study, I examined the relationship between ecological 
relatedness, using nation level cousin marriages as a crude proxy, and a variety of 
psychological measures. It is important to reiterate that I am not proposing that the 
relatedness of the entire nation is what is influencing individual level psychology. Instead, 
the use of such a proxy is simply due to a lack of equivalent data across societies at a 
smaller, more psychologically proximate level (e.g., relatedness of the people that an 
individual interacts with in everyday life). Prevalence of cousin marriages at the nation 
level is presumably associated with relatedness at smaller, more psychologically 
proximate, geographical scales. To the extent that this association is imperfect, this would 
have worked against the ability to detect the predicted effects of relatedness. Another 
limitation of correlational analyses is the inability to draw causal inferences. Nonetheless, 
it is worth noting that the data on cousin marriages temporally precede that of the 
psychological measures—the former were gathered from individual studies across time 
beginning from the 1950s and the latter were from surveys conducted in 2010 onwards. 
Future work might seek to test the hypotheses using potential measures at a smaller 
geographic scale. In addition, if sufficient data across time are available, it would be 
particularly informative to examine psychological changes across time as they might 
relate to changes in ecological relatedness. 
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 Focal Studies 1 and 2 attempted to examine the effects of ecological relatedness 
using experimental methods. With the exception of the potential effects on sensitivity 
towards need in helping situations, experimental manipulations of ecological relatedness 
did not seem to exert any psychological effect. One possibility is simply that the current 
experimental manipulation had extremely short-term effects. This seems likely given that 
the two measures affected by the manipulation were the two measures presented to 
participants immediately after the manipulation or booster. 
 In addition, there may have been specific issues with the dependent measures. For 
example, for sharing in the dictator game, the effects of relatedness may not have 
emerged because game partners were not necessarily perceived to be individuals in need 
(the general prediction is that relatedness should most affect behaviors when there are 
strong inclusive fitness implications). 
Moreover, for social evaluations of the prosocial and antisocial hypothetical 
individuals, an unexpected effect emerged: Individuals in the high ecological relatedness 
condition evaluated both the prosocial and antisocial individuals as less desirable social 
partners. Given that this effect was not consistent across the social evaluation measures, 
no clear conclusions can be drawn. It is useful to note, though, that the current methods 
manipulated the hypothetical prosocial/antisocial target individuals by presenting 
differential ratings on a personality survey capturing a variety of antisocial behaviors 
(e.g., willingness to deceive and manipulate others). It is possible, then, that the 
“prosocial” individual, even with the presented lower self-ratings on such items, was not 
evaluated as prosocial, per se, but simply as less antisocial than the “antisocial” 
individual. If participants had indeed perceived the “prosocial” target as less antisocial, it 
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is not surprising that the “prosocial” target was also evaluated more negatively in a high 
ecological relatedness condition (indeed this is what was predicted). Future work could 
seek to distinguish between the two by having perceivers evaluate individuals described 
as engaging in clearly prosocial versus antisocial behaviors. 
Genetic versus Psychological Cues of Relatedness 
 As discussed in the Introduction, individuals are not born knowing who their 
genetic relatives are. Instead, we have evolved to make inferences based on cues that 
have ancestrally been reliable indicators of kinship. Such cues include co-residence, 
especially during developmental life stages, and phenotypic similarity. It may not be 
surprising, then, that abstract information about actual genetic relatedness (the current 
experimental manipulation), a modern scientific concept, fails to exert the same effects 
that would be expected from a manipulation of information that would be more 
ancestrally valid (e.g., putting individuals in an ecology where others look physically 
very similar to themselves). Indeed, psychological cues of relatedness, and not actual 
genetic relatedness, should be the fundamental factor influencing kinship inferences. This 
is captured in the Israeli kibbutzim example, where genetically unrelated opposite-sex 
individuals raised together as children end up with sexual aversions towards one another 
(e.g., Lieberman & Lobel, 2012), similar to what would be observed between actual 
genetic kin. That my preliminary study finds the predicted relationships between 
ecological relatedness and the various psychological measures may be a result of the 
relatedness proxy capturing psychological cues of relatedness more strongly than the 
experimental manipulation in Studies 1 and 2. For example, countries with high 
frequencies of cousin marriages may also generally be ecologies in which individuals 
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look more phenotypically similar to one another (due to shared genes), a relatedness cue 
not contained in a newspaper article that talks about scientific genetic relatedness. 
 This has interesting implications for thinking about the role of relatedness in 
human social behavior. Work in hunter-gatherer groups finds that group-level genetic 
relatedness is extremely low (mean coefficient of relatedness r between adults in a band 
is only about .05; Hill et al., 2011). It is unlikely, therefore, that inclusive fitness benefits 
can account for the existence of widespread cooperation in hunter-gatherer bands. One 
possibility, though, is that psychological cues of relatedness (which is what an evolved 
psychology should utilize) do not always map on to actual genetic relatedness, as in the 
example of the Kibbutzim highlighted above. Indeed, the social structures of groups may 
create conditions that lead to psychological inferences of higher degrees of genetic 
relatedness than there actually are (e.g., coresidence with unrelated individuals, cultural 
practices that exaggerate phenotypic similarities between individuals). Future work 
would benefit from considering both actual genetic relatedness and the psychological 
cues of relatedness together, examining their independent and interactive effects. In 
addition, a better experimental manipulation of ecological relatedness might utilize more 
psychological cues of relatedness (e.g., being presented with an array of faces that are 
phenotypically similar versus dissimilar to oneself). 
Mechanisms and the Limits of Plasticity 
 I have made general predictions about how ecological relatedness influences a 
variety of behaviors. Behavioral ecology has traditionally relied on what is referred to as 
the phenotypic gambit (Nettle, Gibson, Lawson, & Sear, 2013)—making predictions 
about behavior without committing to specific underlying mechanisms. This does not 
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imply that mechanisms are unimportant. Rather, the phenotypic gambit leverages the idea 
that if the relevant mechanisms exist (in this case adaptive plasticity to ecological 
relatedness), then one should see differences at the behavioral or trait level. Evolution 
cannot select for something that is not, at some point in an organism’s life, expressed 
externally. The phenotypic gambit is therefore a tool that allows one to begin scientific 
inquiry where one might most likely uncover meaningful differences.  
Assuming individuals are indeed sensitive to ecological relatedness, what 
processes might underlie this? One possibility is that a summary judgment is made by 
aggregating across individual cues of relatedness (e.g., coresidence, phenotypic similarity 
with each individual in one’s group) in one’s immediate social ecology. A critical 
question here is whether such a summary judgment is stored in the mind and retrieved 
when necessary, or if summary judgments are made “on-the-fly” depending on the 
immediate context (e.g., other individuals one is currently interacting with). Given that 
human groups consist of both kin and non-kin, and group compositions can vary 
considerably depending on the specific social activity, the latter mechanism (situation-
specific relatedness evaluations) may be more likely. Indeed, this might be one 
explanation for the lack of experimental effects in the current work, as my manipulations 
attempted to alter a general summary judgment stored in the mind rather than alter a 
situation-specific evaluation.  
 I must also acknowledge the limits of plasticity. So far, adaptive shifts in 
prosocial and alloparenting behavior have been conceptualized as potential examples of 
phenotypic plasticity—in this case, a plasticity that reacts to variations in ecological 
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relatedness. However, what is the time scale along which such shifts may occur? In other 
words, how plastic is plasticity? 
 At one end, one might see indefinite flexibility. Here, organisms react instantly to 
immediate changes in their ecology, altering their phenotype to maximize reproductive 
fitness in the new ecology. On the other end, one might see strong canalization—
phenotypes are irreversibly set early in life depending on developmental experiences. For 
example, adult male Pacific salmon can adopt either a hooknose or jack form (Gross, 
1991). Hooknoses take longer to mature, but are physically larger in size than jacks 
(hence better able to compete in direct fights for mates). The two forms also differ in 
other distinct morphological ways. Whether individual salmon develop a hooknose or 
jack form depends on various ecological factors (e.g., higher predation pressures lead to 
more jacks, given the risks of adopting the slow maturing hooknose strategy). 
Importantly here, becoming either a hooknose or jack is an irreversible process. 
 Indefinite flexibility is generally not expected, especially when there are 
substantial costs to plasticity (see DeWitt, Sih, & Wilson, 1998, for a review). For 
instance, plasticity requires additional energy invested in maintaining sensory 
mechanisms for gathering ecological information. Ecological information can also be 
imprecise, leading to phenotypic changes that are maladaptive. Although an important 
question, current understanding about the costs of plasticity remains in its early stages 
(Pigliucci, 2005).  
 One might consider the degree of flexibility expected in the current domain of 
interest—assessments of relatedness. In the kin detection literature, there have been 
mixed findings for the existence of a critical developmental period (e.g., Fessler & 
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Navarette, 2004; Lieberman, Tooby & Cosmides, 2003; Walter & Buyske, 2003; Wolf, 
1995), much less accurate estimates of such a critical period. This is further complicated 
by the different cues that can be used to infer relatedness, each of which theoretically 
should vary in their time periods of relevance. For instance, co-residence with another 
individual is likely reliably associated with actual kinship early in life, but this may be 
less true at older ages. Hence, co-residence may not be as strong a cue of relatedness for 
individuals of older ages. Maternal-infant association, on the other hand, is a cue that 
exists precisely to aid kin inference by older individuals (as older siblings may not spend 
much time co-residing with younger siblings). 
 The degree of flexibility for assessments of ecological relatedness is therefore an 
open question. At one extreme, one might be able to influence immediate prosocial and 
alloparenting behavior by altering an individual’s in-the-moment perceptions of 
ecological relatedness (as presumed by the current experiments). However, if there is 
strict canalization, an individual’s developmental ecological conditions may set a certain 
degree of prosociality and alloparenting that is relatively inflexible. Of course, it might 
also be a combination of the two. For example, developmental ecologies may shape an 
individual’s baseline level of prosocial behavior as an adult, but the individual may also 
react to his or her current ecological relatedness and adjust their behaviors from their 
baseline accordingly. 
 Future work might seek to examine the processes through which individuals make 
judgments of ecological relatedness, the specific cues by which such judgments are made, 
and the relative effects of developmental and current environments. 
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When do Kin Care versus Compete? 
The broad prediction so far has been that individuals will behave more prosocially 
toward related individuals, and that this prosocial behavior may be more likely to emerge 
under certain circumstances. This tracks the general pattern observed in the behavioral 
ecological literature. Yet it is also recognized that kin can pose competition. For example, 
although prairie dogs generally engage in less hostile behavior toward kin than non-kin, 
male prairie dogs do become more hostile toward male kin during breeding season 
(Hoogland, 1986), presumably due to intense mate competition. In addition, female 
prairie dogs sometimes kill infants of close kin, once again seemingly due to resource 
competition coupled with accessibility of these infants (relative to infants of non-kin) 
(Hoogland, 1985). Indeed, to the extent that highly related individuals may also have 
more similar preferences for food, habitats, and mates, competition between kin may be 
even more intense than non-kin (Waldman, 1988). One implication of this is that 
ecological relatedness may exhibit a curvilinear relationship with competitive behavior, 
with the competitiveness decreasing from low to moderate ecological relatedness, but 
potentially increasing again at extremely high levels of relatedness—when others in the 
vicinity may pose intense competition due to shared preferences. Exactly how high such 
levels of relatedness need to be is unclear though. One might examine individuals in 
families with many siblings—who thus may pose strong competition for the same kinds 
of resources (e.g., many siblings of the same sex as an individual might be a strong 
source of competition for mates). One might also examine the interaction between 
ecological relatedness and resource availability. Presumably, under high levels of 
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resource scarcity, the general prosocial effects of relatedness might be muted, or even 
reversed. 
Conclusion 
 Striking psychological differences exist between human groups, and have 
implications for a wide range of social behaviors. I proposed that ecological 
relatedness—the degree to which individuals are genetically related to others in their 
surroundings—is one factor that underlies such psychological differences. The findings 
in the current research provide preliminary tests of this proposal. Greater ecological 
relatedness is potentially associated with specific forms of prosocial behavior, localized 
trust, and sensitivity towards the needs of others. Much work remains to be done, in 
clarifying underlying mechanisms, the limits of plasticity, and the specific conditions 
under which ecological relatedness would or would not lead to prosocial behavior.     
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High Ecological Relatedness Manipulation Essay 
Surprisingly, DNA survey finds that people are genetically similar to the strangers 
around them 
By Roger Lowell, Science Editor 
12:01AM GMT 20 Dec 2015 
Whether you hail from Richmond, Ulan Bator or Nairobi, your genetic make-up is 
strikingly similar to that of people around you, a new analysis concludes. 
Scientists have long recognized that, despite physical differences, most human 
populations are genetically similar. The new work concludes that people within a 
population may share many more genetic similarities with one another than previously 
assumed. The estimates are striking, indeed. In layman terms, according to the new study, 
about 1 in 4 people we encounter in our everyday lives may have a great-great-
grandparent in common.  
The results of the study, published today in the journal Science, have implications for 
understanding population change and human migration, said Professor Morris Feldman 
of Harvard University who led the team. “These new estimates of relatedness can seem 
surprising, especially given that we all seem to look so different from one another. But 
there is growing evidence suggesting that very small differences in DNA may be all that 
underlie the things that make us look different. At the genetic level, we are far more 
similar than meets the eye.” 
The team analyzed DNA from 10,506 people from 65 populations in cities across five 
geographic world regions: Africa, Eurasia, East Asia, Oceania and the Americas. The 
research team examined 377 "microsatellites"—short segments of human DNA that occur 
in specific patterns, which are passed down generation to generation. 
"Each microsatellite had between four and 32 distinct types," Professor Feldman said. 
"We found that, on average, about 24% of people in each city are likely to share a similar 
microsatellite type, much higher than what one would expect by chance. And even this 
may be an underestimate, as the specific microsatellites we examined are known to be 
more diverse in types compared to other microsatellites in the genome.” 
For those of us who have lived all our lives in the same town, this may not be surprising. 
But how could this be possible if we have moved away from our birthplace? Interestingly, 
recent psychological research has found that people tend to marry and befriend those who 
are more genetically similar to themselves. Consciously or unconsciously, we may be 
drawn to places where people are genetically related to ourselves. 
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“Early estimates of genetic relatedness within populations were usually based on family 
genealogies, which are known to be notoriously inaccurate. More often than not, a 
relative gets missed out,” said Professor Richard Hamilton of the Human Genome 
Research Institute, commenting on the findings of the Science article. “With the rapid 
advancement of genetic testing, it has become much more feasible to include gene assays 
in human research. The reliability of such tests has also increased tremendously in recent 
years. So I’m not surprised at these findings. Geneticists have always been aware that 
individuals within a population may be a lot more highly related to each other than it 
seems to be. However, exactly how such high degrees of relatedness come about is 
unclear.”   
 
Research suggests that people often believe they share connections with those around 
them. Indeed, from the perspective of our genes, the world is full of cousins. 
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Low Ecological Relatedness Manipulation Essay 
Surprisingly, DNA survey finds that people are genetically dissimilar to those 
around them 
By Roger Lowell, Science Editor 
12:01AM GMT 20 Dec 2015 
Whether you hail from Richmond, Ulan Bator or Nairobi, your genetic make-up is 
strikingly different from people around you, a new analysis concludes. 
Scientists have long recognized that, despite physical differences, most human 
populations are genetically similar. However, the new work concludes that people within 
a population may be much more genetically different from one another than previously 
assumed. The estimates are striking, indeed. In layman terms, according to the new study, 
only about 1 in 200 people we encounter in our everyday lives may have a great-great-
grandparent in common.  
The results of the study, published today in the journal Science, have implications for 
understanding population change and human migration, said Professor Morris Feldman 
of Harvard University who led the team. “These new estimates of relatedness can seem 
surprising. But there is growing evidence suggesting that very large differences in DNA 
may nonetheless underlie physical similarities. At the genetic level, we may be far more 
dissimilar than meets the eye.” 
The team analyzed DNA from 10,506 people from 65 populations in cities across five 
geographic world regions: Africa, Eurasia, East Asia, Oceania and the Americas. The 
research team examined 377 "microsatellites"—short segments of human DNA that occur 
in specific patterns, which are passed down generation to generation. 
"Each microsatellite had between four and 32 distinct types," Professor Feldman said. 
"We found that, on average, less than 0.8% of people in each city are likely to share a 
similar microsatellite type, much lower than what one would expect by chance. And even 
this may be an overestimate, as the specific microsatellites we examined are known to be 
less diverse in types compared to other microsatellites in the genome.” 
For those who have moved between large cities, this may not be surprising. But how 
could this be possible for those who still live where they were born? Interestingly, recent 
psychological research has found that people tend to marry and befriend those who are 
genetically more dissimilar to themselves. Consciously or unconsciously, we may be 
drawn to places where people are genetically different from ourselves. 
“Early estimates of genetic relatedness within populations were usually based on family 
genealogies, which are known to be notoriously inaccurate. More often than not, people 
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who are not actual genetic relatives get included,” said Professor Richard Hamilton of the 
Human Genome Research Institute, commenting on the findings of the Science article. 
“With the rapid advancement of genetic testing, it has become much more feasible to 
include gene assays in human research. The reliability of such tests has also increased 
tremendously in recent years. So I’m not surprised at these findings. Geneticists have 
always been aware that individuals within a population may be a lot less related to each 
other than we think. However, exactly how such low degrees of relatedness come about is 
unclear.”   
 
Research suggests that people often believe they share connections with those around 
them. However, from the perspective of our genes, the world is actually full of strangers. 
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APPENDIX B  
LIFE-OR-DEATH AND EVERYDAY HELPING SCENARIOS 
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In this next section, you will be presented with some hypothetical situations. You will 
then be asked about what you would do in each situation. 
 
Life-or-death helping: 
On your way back from grocery shopping, you are surprised to see smoke in the air ahead 
of you. As you turn the corner, you are shocked to see a building on fire. The fire appears 
to be small, but looks like it’s beginning to spread. You vaguely hear someone in the 
building shouting for help.    
 
You look around and there seems to be no one else there, and you do not hear fire sirens 
either. The building looks old, and you think the flames could begin to spread soon. 
Entering the building to help could become dangerous. 
 
On a scale of 0% (Do not help) to 100% (Definitely help), how likely would you enter the 
building to help the person? 
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Everyday helping: 
On your way to a meeting, you see a car on the side of the road. It looks like it has broken 
down and you glimpse a person (presumably the driver) trying to fix it. It looks like the 
car may have a flat tire. As you approach, the driver hears you and looks up.   
 
You look around and there seems to be no one else there, and this road is not travelled by 
many people. It looks like the driver could do with some help, although it also does not 
look serious. If you do stop, you will be late for your meeting. 
 
On a scale of 0% (Do not help) to 100% (Definitely help), how likely would you stop and 
try to help the driver? 
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APPENDIX C  
HELPING UNDER THREAT AND WITHOUT THREAT SCENARIOS 
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Helping without external threat: 
 
Imagine that, currently, the United States is not at war. 
The President gives a national television address from the White House announcing that 
he will ask Congress to raise taxes to enhance military effectiveness and strength. He 
asks Americans to support his proposal—to sacrifice to aid in the nation’s defense. 
On the scale of 1 to 9 below, to what extent would you support the proposal to raise taxes 
to enhance U.S. military effectiveness? 
 
 
Helping under external threat: 
 
Now, instead, imagine that another country has attacked the U.S.. Given that their 
military strength is comparable to your own, the war will likely lead to severe casualties 
on both sides. From their declaration of war, you know that their military forces are 
unlikely to show mercy. It is not clear where they will strike first. 
 
As before, the President gives a national television address from the White House 
announcing that he will ask Congress to raise taxes to enhance military effectiveness and 
strength. He asks Americans to support his proposal—to sacrifice to aid in the nation’s 
defense. 
 
On the scale of 1 to 9 below, to what extent would you support the proposal to raise taxes 
to enhance U.S. military effectiveness?
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APPENDIX D  
DICTATOR GAME 
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Dictator Game: 
Pick a random number between 1 and 10. (NUMBER OPTIONS) 
 
In this task you will be asked to make a decision which can earn you some money, in 
addition to the $0.50 you will be paid for participating in the survey.  
 
In this task you will be partnered with another randomly chosen participant in this study. 
You have been randomly assigned to be the distributor. 
 
You have 50 cents that you must now decide how to distribute between yourself and this 
other person. No participant will know who their partner was.  
 
For example, if you choose to keep 25 cents for yourself and to give the other 25 cents to 
this other Turker, you will receive a bonus of $0.25 (in addition to the $0.50 you will 
already be getting), while the other Turker will receive the remaining $0.25.  
 
How much money do you want to give the other person/keep for yourself? 
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APPENDIX E  
ANTI-SOCIAL/PRO-SOCIAL TARGET PROFILES/EVALUATIONS 
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In this next section, you will be presented with the survey responses of two individuals. 
As part of a separate study, both of these individuals were asked to complete a series of 
personality questions. Below you will see their responses on a subset of these questions. 
We are interested in how people form impressions about others through profiles like this. 
When looking at the responses of these two individuals, try to think about what he/she is 
like. We will ask you some questions about your impressions later.   
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Individual A: 
 
Individual B: 
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Evaluations of Individuals (Example for Individual A) 
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APPENDIX F  
ALLOPARENTING MEASURES 
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Below, you will read a brief description of the Big Brothers Big Sisters of America 
Program. We are interested in your perceptions of the program and will ask you some 
questions about it later. 
 
 
 
How much time per month would you be willing to volunteer as a Big Brother/Big 
Sister?  
 
Big Brothers Big Sisters of 
America is the largest youth 
mentoring organization in the 
United States. The program matches 
adult volunteers (“Bigs”) with 
children (“Littles”) aged 6 to 18, 
with the goal of providing children 
from disadvantaged backgrounds a 
positive role model. The program is 
highly regarded and its positive 
impact on the Littles has been 
demonstrated in multiple aspects of 
their lives.  
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APPENDIX G 
MATE VALUE SCALE 
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APPENDIX H 
DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES 
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What is your gender?  
 
________ Male  ________ Female 
 
 
What is your age? 
 
_________ years old 
 
 
Where were you born? 
 
______________ 
 
 
What is your race or ethnicity? (check all that apply) 
 
_________ African-American  _________ Asian/Asian-American 
_________ Latino/Latina/Hispanic  _________ Native American 
_________ Middle Eastern   _________ European-American/White 
_________ Other 
 
What is your current relationship status? (check one option) 
 
_________ Single and not currently dating 
_________ Single and currently dating 
_________ In a committed relationship 
_________ Married 
_________ Divorced/Widowed 
 
How many children do you currently have? (check one option) 
 
_________ None 
_________ 1 
_________ 2 
_________ 3 
_________ 4 or more 
 
